In the early hours of June 13, Israel launched a large-scale aerial offensive against multiple military and nuclear-related targets inside Iran. Dubbed “Operation Rising Lion”, the strikes targeted senior military commanders, nuclear scientists, air defense infrastructure and suspected ballistic missile facilities. Israel has framed the campaign as a necessary measure to halt Iran’s advancing nuclear program, and officials have stated that the operation will continue “for as long as necessary”. Iranian airspace has been closed, and retaliatory drone attacks have been reported. As of this writing, the operation appears to mark the beginning of a sustained confrontation, rather than a single, isolated incident.
Strategic Motives Behind Israel’s Action
While the Israeli leadership tries to justify the strikes as preemptive and necessary in light of recent IAEA reports expressing concern over Iran’s expanding nuclear program, it is important to note that there was still no conclusive evidence that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon. A consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies held that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. The international legal and normative justification for the operation remains weak. The IAEA’s concern has not translated into confirmation of weaponization activity. In this context, Israel’s actions appear to be part of a calculated strategy of coercion and disruption, drawing from precedents such as its sustained campaigns in Lebanon and Syria.
The pattern of Israeli targeting provides important insight. By initiating the operation with decapitation strikes on senior military leadership, Israel appears to be following a playbook focused on overwhelming shock and disruption. This tactic is not new. It was used extensively in Lebanon: targeting command-and-control nodes first in order to disorient the adversary’s decision-making apparatus and delay an effective military or political response. This initial paralysis allows Israel time and space to prepare for subsequent operations, politically and militarily. It may also serve to create more favorable conditions for conducting more extensive and potentially more effective strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
Furthermore, several strikes appear to have targeted military installations and suspected missile storage facilities, in line with the broader objective of preempting Iranian retaliation. These attacks serve the dual purpose of disrupting Iran’s capacity to escalate and setting the stage for a longer-term campaign. This pattern suggests that the campaign is not conditioned on Iranian retaliation; rather, it appears structured to proceed in stages irrespective of how or when Tehran chooses to respond. Israeli political and military discourse in the hours following the operation has made clear that it views this as the first phase of a broader strategic campaign, which will continue regardless of Tehran’s immediate reaction.
Psychological and Perceptual Dimensions
Another core layer of Israel’s strategy appears to be psychological and perceptual. Through its selection of targets, public messaging, and controlled scope of the initial wave of attacks, Israel is clearly attempting to send a message to the Iranian public that this is a war against the regime, not the people. The strikes largely avoided civilian infrastructure in the first round, though there have been confirmed civilian casualties. At the same time, Israeli officials have made direct appeals to Iranians through both traditional and social media. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that Israel is not at war with the Iranian people and even claimed that “the day of their liberation is near”.
This strategy is predicated on exploiting the internal fragmentation within Iran. Years of economic pressure, political repression and social unrest have widened the gap between the state and large segments of Iranian society. Israel is likely hoping to deepen that divide. If the public perceives the campaign as focused solely on the ruling elite and military apparatus, Israel hopes it may dampen popular support for retaliation and possibly even encourage internal dissent.
This approach, however, carries inherent risks. By turning a military operation into a psychological campaign aimed at influencing public opinion inside Iran, Israel is elevating the stakes significantly. If the psychological strategy fails, or if Iranian society rallies around the flag in the face of foreign aggression and potential further civilian casualties, the plan may backfire.
A Campaign Beyond the Nuclear Question
While the declared goal of Operation Rising Lion is to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a closer reading of the operation’s structure and messaging suggests that the nuclear issue may be only one among several strategic objectives. Given the long-standing technical assessments that Israel alone cannot destroy Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities without sustained, repeated strikes and ground-level sabotage, it is unlikely that Israel believes it can eliminate Iran’s nuclear program through airstrikes alone.
Instead, the more plausible interpretation is that Israel aims to degrade the stability of the Islamic Republic itself. If prolonged, the campaign may seek to provoke internal unrest through combined military, economic and psychological pressure. The calculated use of media messaging alongside kinetic strikes reinforces the idea that the ultimate objective may be political destabilization, with the nuclear program merely serving as a public justification.
If this is indeed the case, future phases of the campaign may include targeting Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure. By broadening the scope of the war to affect the daily lives of ordinary Iranians, Israel may aim to generate a domestic crisis that forces the Iranian government into deeper strategic confusion or even existential instability.
Iran’s Strategic Dilemma
Tehran now faces a strategic conundrum with no easy exits. A forceful response—especially one that causes Israeli casualties or infrastructure damage—is likely to trigger an immediate escalation in which Israel expands the target set to include economic assets, energy systems and possibly symbolic political centers. On the other hand, a restrained or delayed response could invite a repeat of Israel’s Lebanon and Syria strategies: an extended campaign of attritional strikes aimed at degrading military infrastructure, eroding morale and exhausting the regime over time.
In this context, Iran’s capacity to retaliate becomes critical. While Iran possesses a vast arsenal of ballistic missiles stored in underground silos, unconfirmed social media reports suggest that Israel may have targeted tunnel exits and launch infrastructure, potentially limiting Iran’s ability to mobilize these weapons in the short term. Beyond immediate capabilities, the larger question is whether Iran’s command structure has suffered sufficient disruption to hinder coordinated retaliation. Though senior commanders have already been replaced, strategic disruption at the top levels could delay effective response planning.
Regionally, Iran’s options are also constrained. Hezbollah remains a relatively potent force, but its domestic and military position in Lebanon has weakened. A major offensive from Hezbollah would risk a second war front, likely to be devastating for both Lebanon and Hezbollah’s already fragile political credibility. The Houthis are already engaged at near-maximum capacity, and their geographic distance limits their utility. Iraqi militias could potentially escalate against U.S. assets in the region, but lack the capacity to strike Israel effectively.
This raises a further dilemma for Iranian decision-makers: should Iran retaliate directly against the United States? Publicly, Washington claims it was not involved in the Israeli operation, though it did have prior knowledge. An Iranian decision to escalate against U.S. bases or assets, either directly or through proxies, would provoke a military response and risk triggering wider regional hostilities. Moreover, such action would unravel Iran’s cautious détente with several Gulf Arab states and further isolate Tehran diplomatically.
Implications for the Nuclear Program
In the nuclear domain, Iran may now consider exiting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or even pursuing weaponization. This would mark a fundamental shift in Iranian policy. However, the feasibility of such a move depends on whether Iran already possesses—or can realistically attain under the pressures of an ongoing war—the other essential components of a nuclear weapons program, including delivery systems and weaponization infrastructure beyond uranium enrichment. If those assets are not available, moving to a breakout posture under sustained military threat could be logistically difficult and politically costly.
On the other hand, if Israel’s calculation that it can engineer regime decay proves incorrect, then the incentives for Iran to pursue a nuclear deterrent will only grow stronger. In that case, the question will no longer be whether Iran will move toward nuclear armament, but when.
